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Abstract. Adversarial examples are maliciously tweaked images that
can easily fool machine learning techniques, such as neural networks, but
they are normally not visually distinguishable for human beings. One of
the main approaches to solve this problem is to retrain the networks us-
ing those adversarial examples, namely adversarial training. However,
standard adversarial training might not actually change the decision
boundaries but cause the problem of gradient masking, resulting in a
weaker ability to generate adversarial examples [1]. Therefore, it cannot
alleviate the problem of black-box attacks, where adversarial examples
generated from other networks can transfer to the targeted one. In order
to reduce the problem of black-box attacks, we propose a novel method
that allows two networks to learn from each others’ adversarial examples
and become resilient to black-box attacks. We also combine this method
with a simple domain adaptation to further improve the performance.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been widely used to do facial recognition, surveil-
lance, automotive driving and other tasks that require a high standard of safety.
However, it has been found that by adding some unnoticeable perturbations to
input images, i.e. adversarial noise, deep neural networks can be easily fooled [2].
Furthermore, these adversarial examples often transfer, which means that ad-
versarial examples that fool one network can also easily fool another one. This
is known as black-box attacks [3]. In order to increase the robustness to the
transferability of adversarial examples for faces, we propose a novel method that
allows two networks to learn from each others’ adversarial examples.
Standard adversarial training is proven to be effective to the same type of
white-box attacks that are used to generate adversarial examples [4] [5], but
ineffective to black-box attacks due to gradient masking [6]. After a network
has been trained, its adversarial examples can be generated by various meth-
ods, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method or Least Likely Class method. These
adversarial examples can easily fool the network as they are found using the net-
work’s weights and gradients, which is known as white-box attacks [6]. Standard
adversarial training retrains the network using original data and its adversar-
ial examples to make it more robust to the same type of white-box attacks [2].
However, it has been found that adversarial examples generated from defended
networks (using standard adversarial training) lose the ability to easily fool other
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undefended networks due to the problem of gradient masking [6]. Furthermore,
it has also been found that the decision boundaries of the defended networks
(using standard adversarial training) remain unchanged, and thus the defended
networks remain vulnerable to black-box attacks [1].
We propose a method that trains two networks simultaneously to make both
of them more resilient to black-box attacks from a third holdout network, and
we call it Simultaneous Adversarial Training Method (SATM). SATM is imple-
mented and tested on the Adience dataset where 26,580 faces are labelled with
gender and age group [7]. We show some visually noticeable adversarial exam-
ples on Adience dataset and we find that, unlike databases for object recognition,
those adversarial examples can be visually misleading to human beings when the
adversarial noise is set to be large enough. Additionally, we find that, for net-
works that do not have batch normalisation layers [8] such as VGGNets [9],
distribution of features of adversarial examples is different from that of original
data. Therefore, we add a domain adaptation [10] to further improve generalis-
ability.
In this paper, we introduce methods to generate adversarial examples and
methods to prevent white-box and black-box attacks in Section 2. Dataset and
some visually noticeable adversarial examples are shown in Section 3. In Section
4 we introduce our methodology in details and in Section 5 we show and analyse
experiments results. Finally, we conclude what we have found and achieved and
what can be done for future work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Various countermeasures for adversarial examples have been proposed for differ-
ent types of attacks. Two main defense approaches are: 1) detecting and reject-
ing adversarial examples in testing stage to prevent adversarial attacks, and 2)
making networks themselves more robust to adversarial examples, e.g. adversar-
ial training. In this section, algorithms for generating adversarial examples are
listed first, and then some state-of-the-art countermeasures are introduced.
2.1 Algorithms for Generating Adversarial Examples
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) FGSM computes one step gradient
and adds the sign of the gradient to raw images [2]. It is defined as:
xadv = x+ ε · sign(OxJ(x, ytrue)) (1)
where x is raw images, ytrue is the labels, J is the loss function and ε controls the
magnitude of the adversarial noise. Some variants of FGSM are used to enhance
the generated adversarial examples. For example, Fast Gradient Value method
removed the sign function [11] and [12] combined momentum and an ensembling
method with FGSM and won NIPS 2017 Targeted and Non-Targeted Adversarial
Attacks Competition.
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Single-Step Least Likely Class method (Step-LL) Step-LL replaced ytrue
with yleast−likely, and [13] showed it was the most effective for adversarial train-
ing on ImageNet. It is defined as:
xadv = x+ ε · sign(5xJ(x, yleast−likely)) (2)
where yleast−likely = argminy {p(y|x)} and p(y|x) is the probability that the
network would predict y given x.
Randomised single-step attack (R+Step-LL) [6] showed that the vicinity
of data points in loss function is not smooth. Simply using FGSM or ILLC might
not suffice to find the actual adversarial direction. Therefore, they proposed a
new randomised single-step attack which adds a small random step to escape
from the non-smooth vicinity before computing gradients. R+Step-LL is defined
as:
xadv = x′+(ε−α) ·sign(Ox′J(x′, ytrue)),where x′ = x+α ·sign(N(0d, Id)) (3)
Other algorithms such as DeepFool [14], CPPN EA Fool [15], Hot/Cold
method [11] and Natural GANs [16] can also be used to generate adversarial
examples. Particularly, stronger adversarial attacks that require much less per-
turbations such as L2, L0, L∞ attacks introduced by [17] can be used as the main
adversarial attacks for future work. They often succeed with 100% probability
with less than 4/256 distortion and normally they will not be visibly noticeable.
Additionally, Step-LL, FGSM and R+Step-LL can be iterated many times but
in this paper we would focus on single-step attack and we direct readers to [18]
for further insights about iterative attacks. However, even though it is effective
to weak iterative adversarial attacks, it has been broken by [19]. We direct read-
ers to a holistic survey [20] for further information about generating adversarial
examples.
In this paper, we use single-step R+Step-LL to generate adversarial examples
for both training and testing with ε = 16/256 and α = ε/2.
2.2 Countermeasures Without Adversarial Training
Both the two main defense approaches mentioned above in Section 2 can fight
against adversarial examples without adversarial training. In this section, we
introduce cutting-edge methods of the first type and methods of the second type
that do not involve adversarial training respectively. They were proven to be
effective for weak adversarial attacks such as FGSM or Step-LL but some of
them have been broken by stronger attacks [19] such as L2, L0, L∞ attacks [17].
In testing stage, adversarial examples can be prevented by either: 1) train a
separate classifier to distinguish adversarial examples from clean data [21] [22]
[23] [24], or 2) find the differences between them by analysing their features. A
wide variety of tricks can be used in the first case. For example, [25] used soft
labels and added a null class to counteract adversarial examples. In the second
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case, features that are chosen to distinguish adversarial examples from clean
data vary. For example, [26] found the certainty of adversarial examples is higher
than clean data from a Bayesian perspective and [27] found coefficients in low-
ranked components between adversarial examples and clean data were different.
However, they have both been broken by stronger attacks with a slight increase
in distortion [19] [28]. Given that [29] found that adversarial examples have a
different distribution from clean data, we combine a simple domain adaptation
with our method to further improve the performance.
It is also possible to make networks more resilient to adversarial examples
without adversarial training, [30] used high-temperature softmax to make models
less sensitive to unnoticeable perturbations. [31] used double back-propagation to
penalise large gradients and they found the regularisation scheme was equivalent
to first order adversarial training. However, it has been shown that distillation
does not make networks more robust to stronger attacks [17] [32].
2.3 Adversarial Training Methods
Using adversarial training introduced by [2] can prevent white-box attacks. How-
ever, instead of generally reducing adversarial vulnerability, the method can
cause the problem of gradient masking [6]. Due to the problem, after first-step
adversarial training, the adversarially trained networks can only generate ad-
versarial examples that are easier for undefended networks to classify, but the
decision boundaries of the adversarially trained networks remain unchanged [1].
Thus, the adversarially trained networks remain vulnerable to black-box attacks.
In order to reduce the risk of black-box attacks, [6] proposed a method of
ensemble adversarial training which used one pre-trained network only for gen-
erating adversarial examples and then used those adversarial examples to train
another network. This way, the adversarially trained network became more re-
silient to black-box attacks from a third holdout network.
Similarly, [33] proposed a method of cascade adversarial machine learning
regularized with a unified embedding which uses one already defended network
to generate adversarial examples to re-train another one. They found iterative
attacks transfer more easily between networks that are trained using the same
strategy i.e. standard training/Kurakin’s adversarial training[13]. They also in-
troduce a regularisation with a unified embedding which aligns features of ad-
versarial examples and their corresponding clean data. This way, visually similar
images would have similar features and it thus improves robustness of networks.
3 Adversarial Examples of Faces
In this section, we first introduce the dataset we use and then we show com-
parisons between original data and visually noticeable adversarial examples. We
find that, unlike object recognition, some adversarial examples can be misleading
for human beings. Finally, we show some results on white-box attacks with dif-
ferent parameter values. Adversarial examples of faces are posing serious safety
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threads to many face recognition systems, driver monitoring systems and secu-
rity surveillance systems. Therefore a more effective method to fight against this
type of adversarial examples is necessary.
The Adience dataset contains 26,580 unconstrained images of faces from
2,284 subjects, each of them is labelled with gender and eight age groups (0-
2, 4-6, 8-13, 15-20, 25-32, 38-43, 48-53, 60-). These images were collected from
the Flickr albums and they were authorisedly released by their authors under
the Creative Commons (CC) license. All images were taken completely “in the
wile”, which means they were taken under different variations in appearance,
noise, pose, blurring and lighting conditions [7]. According to its protocol, five
cross validation is used to make results more statistically significant [34] [35].
The comparison between some clean testing images and their adversarial
examples on the Adience dataset is shown in Figure 1. These clean testing images
are all classified correctly by a ResNet50-Face [36] that is pre-trained on the
VGGFace Database [37] and fine-tuned on the Adience dataset. However, their
adversarial examples (that are generated using R+Step-LL) are all misclassified.
Similar results can be found if we use VGG16-Face that is pre-trained on the
VGGFace database. As shown in Figure 1, when ε of the Equation 3 (R+Step-
LL) is set to be large enough, we can see the difference between the original data
and adversarial examples clearly. We found that these adversarial examples can
be visually misleading to human beings. For example, the adversarial example of
the top left pair actually looks more senior than the clean one, and the adversarial
example of the top right pair looks younger than the clean one.
Fig. 1. For each pair, the clean image is on the right and its adversarial example
is on the left. Top left (ε = 64/256): labelled as the 1st group but its adversarial
example is misclassified to the 8th. Top right (ε = 32/256): labelled as the 5th
group but its adversarial example is misclassified to the 2nd. Bottom left (ε =
16/256): labelled as the 5th group but its adversarial examples is misclassfied to
the 7th. Bottom right (ε = 8/256): labelled as the 2nd group but its adversarial
example is misclassified to the 4th.
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Table 1. Classification rates of white-box attacks (R+Step-LL)
ε 32/256 16/256 8/256 4/256 Clean data
VGG16-Face 3.95% 4.30% 6.97% 12.13% 56.73%
ResNet-Face 4.29% 8.79% 10.65% 21.8% 59.08%
When ε is set to be between 8/256 and 16/256, adversarial examples become
less visually noticeable but remain the ability to easily fool networks on the Adi-
ence dataset as shown in Table 1. We thus choose R+Step-LL with ε = 16/256
and α = ε/2 to generate adversarial examples for the following experiments.
4 Simultaneous Adversarial Training Method (SATM)
SATM is proposed to alleviate black-box attacks. The procedure is shown in
Figure 2 and the algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1. This method re-trains two
networks simultaneously using clean data and adversarial examples that are
generated from the other network. This way, both networks become more resilient
to black-box attacks from a third holdout network. We also combine domain
adaptation with SATM , which improves generalisability especially for networks
that do not include batch normalisation layers such as VGGNets.
Algorithm 1 Simultaneous Adversarial Training Method (SATM)
1: Fine-tune NetworkA and NetworkB using clean data
2: procedure SATM(NetworkA, NetworkB)
3: Initialise(ε, α, lr, radv, rda, Loss
A, LossB)
4: while not early stopping do . Based on LossA + LossB
5: xAadv ← R+Step-LL(NetworkA, ε, α)
6: xBadv ← R+Step-LL(NetworkB , ε, α)
7: LossA ← NetworkAloss(xclean, ytrue)
8: +radv ∗NetworkAloss(xBadv, ytrue)
9: +rda ∗DAA(NetworkAfeature(xclean), NetworkAfeature(xBadv))
10: LossB ← NetworkBloss(xclean, ytrue)
11: +radv ∗NetworkBloss(xAadv, ytrue)
12: +rda ∗DAB(NetworkBfeature(xclean), NetworkBfeature(xAadv))
13: ωA ← ωA + SGD(lr, LossA, ωA)
14: ωB ← ωB + SGD(lr, LossB , ωB)
15: end while
16: end procedure
17: function R+Step-LL(Network, ε, α)
18: x′ ← x+ α · sign(N(0d, Id)
19: xadv ← x′ + (ε− α) · sign(Ox′Networkloss(x′, ytrue))
20: return xadv . Return adversarial examples
21: end function
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ResNet 50-Face
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Domain Adaptation
VGG16-Face
FC
Domain Adaptation
∇x J(x,y)∇x J(x,y)
Gradient Reversal 
GradientReversal 
Fig. 2. SATM retrains two networks together using clean data and adversarial
examples that are generated from the other network. Additionally, SATM uses
a domain adaptation to align features of clean data and adversarial examples,
which improves generalisability.
4.1 Simultaneous Adversarial Training
SATM re-trains two networks simultaneously but in this section we describe
the method from the perspective of one network first, and then we introduce
the scalability of SATM and generalise it to training multiple (more than two)
networks simultaneously.
As explained in Algorithm 1, for NetworkA, SATM uses clean data and
adversarial examples that are generated from NetworkB to re-train it. In order
to avoid the problem of gradient masking to the largest extent, we do not use
adversarial examples that are generated from NetworkA itself (namely white-
box adversarial examples) to re-train it. Therefore, after NetworkA has been
re-trained using SATM , its adversarial examples still remain “strong” enough
to easily fool undefended networks. Similarly, after using SATM , NetworkB ’s
adversarial examples also remain “strong” enough. This means during the whole
re-training process, SATM uses clean data and “strong” adversarial examples
that are generated from NetworkB to re-train NetworkA. If NetworkB is com-
pletely frozen, then SATM becomes Ensemble Adversarial Training [6] without
using white-box adversarial examples. However, by using SATM , NetworkB ’s
adversarial examples would not simply follow one distribution because SATM
also re-trains NetworkB . This way, both networks can become more resilient to
black-box attacks.
4.2 Domain Adaptation
We combine domain adaptation with SATM as shown in Figure 2. For net-
works without batch normalisation layers such as VGGNets, the distribution of
clean data and the distribution of adversarial examples can be different. We use
a simple domain adaptation block (a binary classifier with two fully-connected
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layers) to reduce the difference and improve generalisability. For NetworkA, the
domain adaptation block distinguishes features of clean data from features of
NetworkB ’s adversarial examples. As shown in Figure 2, the gradient of the
domain adaptation block will go though a gradient reversal layer and then flow
back to NetworkA. This way, those features generated from NetworkA become
more indistinguishable and the generalisability is thus improved [10]. More ad-
vanced domain adaptation methods such as Adversarial Discriminative Domain
Adaption [38] can be used to replace the simplest domain adaptation block, but
here we focus on SATM and show that by combing a domain adaptation method
with SATM , networks can be more resilient to black-box attacks.
4.3 SATM with Multiple Networks
Multiple (more than two) networks can be re-trained using SATM . If SATM
is used to re-train
{
NetworkA, NetworkB ...NetworkK
}
, for NetworkA, clean
data and adversarial examples that are generated from NetworkB , NetworkC ...
NetworkK would be used to re-train it. Adversarial examples can be generated
by those networks interchangeably to ensure that we still use clean data 50
percents of the time. More advanced domain adaptation methods should be used
to deal with the multi-domain adaptation problem. However, when more than
two networks are included, the batch size can be smaller than two, which might
affect the performance of batch normalisation layers and the domain adaptation
method. Therefore we leave SATM with multiple networks as a future work.
We believe that SATM with multiple networks would enumerate more types of
adversarial perturbations. Therefore, networks might finally become more robust
against black-box attacks using SATM with multiple networks.
5 Experiments
In this section we show experimental results on the Adience dataset using SATM.
We use SATM to re-train fine-tuned VGG16-Face and ResNet50-Face simulta-
neously. We show results of white-box attacks first, and then we show results of
black-box attacks both before and after using SATM and we show that SATM
converges. Finally we show black-box attacks results from a third holdout net-
work (which is chosen to be Resnet101 or InceptionResNetV2 that are pre-
trained on ImageNet and fine-tuned on the Adience dataset) before and after
SATM. Results are evaluated using classification rate and one-off classification
rate. One-off classification rate is defined as:
One off =
∑c=C−1
c=0
∑k=min(c+1,C−1)
k=max(c−1,0) confusion matrix[c, k]∑c=C−1
c=0
∑k=C−1
k=0 confusion matrix[c, k]
(4)
where C is the number of classes and confusion matrix[c, k] is the number of
examples of class c and (mis-)classified as class k [34]. Five cross-validation that
is defined in [34] is used as the protocol to evaluate performance, so the results
are statistically significant.
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5.1 White-Box Attacks
As shown in Table 2, both networks become more robust to white-box attacks,
even though SATM is not designed to prevent white-box attacks; SATM does
not use any white-box adversarial examples to re-train networks but the clas-
sification rate and one-off rate of white-box attacks still increase. As shown in
Table 3, adversarial examples that are generated from these adversarially re-
trained networks remain “strong” enough to easily fool undefended networks
such as InceptionV3 or InceptionResNetV2, which indicates that the improve-
ment for white-box attacks does not come from the problem of gradient masking.
Table 2. Results of white-box attacks. Classification rate and One-off increase
after using SATM
Classification rate One-off
VGG16-Face 4.30% → 7.22% 13.90% → 21.43%
ResNet50-Face 8.79% → 12.56% 26.30% → 29.89%
Table 3. The first column is the models we are testing on, and the second
column is the models that are used to generate adversarial examples (attacks).
After using SATM , classification rate and one-off almost remain unchanged.
Adv model Classification rate One-off
InceptionV3 VGG16-Face 14.49% → 14.32% 45.01% → 47.60%
InceptionV3 ResNet50-Face 23.03% → 19.67% 58.81% → 53.99%
5.2 Black-Box Attacks
As shown in Table 4, after VGG16-Face and ResNet50-Face have been adver-
sarially trained using SATM , they both become resilient to each others’ ad-
versarial examples. Classification rates of black-box attacks increase to 52.40%
and 43.25%, which are very close to the classification rates on clean testing data
(56.29% and 51.77%).
Table 4. Results of black-box attacks before and after using SATM .
Adv model Classification rate One off
VGG16-Face ResNet50-Face 35.39% →52.40% 66.99% → 88.55%
ResNet50-Face VGG16-Face 16.25% → 43.25% 36.16% → 76.11%
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5.3 Convergence
As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, during training, the classification rates of
clean data and adversarial examples are relatively similar to each other both on
training set and validation set. After using SATM , the classification rates of
clean data and adversarial examples of training set are both around 90%, which
indicates SATM converges. In another word, after a certain number of iterations
(in this case after 10,000 iterations with mini-batches of size 8 and learning rate
of e−5), the distributions of adversarial examples change more slowly than the
networks adapt to the change. We run experiments on a Tesla K80 GPU and
SATM converges in 20 hours.
Classification rate of clean data Classification rate of adversarial examples
Fig. 3. VGG16-Face’s classification rates of clean data and adversarial examples
on training set. X asix is the number of epochs.
Classification rate of clean data Classification rate of adversarial examples
Fig. 4. VGG16-Face’s classification rates of clean data and adversarial examples
on validation set. X asix is the number of epochs.
5.4 Black-Box Attacks from a Third Holdout Network
As shown in Table 5, we can see a significant improvement of the performance
on black-box attacks from a third holdout networs (ResNet101 and Inception-
ResNetV2). We also show that SATM outperforms the state-of-the-art method
(Ensemble Adversarial Training) on the Adience database. In order to directly
compare SATM with Ensemble Adversarial Training, we do not use any white-
box examples to re-train the networks, and we find that the best performances all
come from SATM . For InceptionNets, When ε is set to 16/256, both undefended
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and adversarially trained VGG16 and ResNet50 are resilient to their adversarial
examples. Therefore we set ε to 32/256 when testing on InceptionResNetV2.
Table 5. Classification rates/one-off rates of black-box attacks from a third hold-
out network, i.e. InceptionResNetV2 or ResNet101-Img which are pre-trained on
ImageNet and fine-tuned on the Adience dataset.
Adv model Undefended Ensemble SATM
VGG16-Face ResNet101-Img 31.29/62.61% 35.87/68.04% 37.40/72.16%
ResNet50-Face ResNet101-Img 22.59/47.57% 25.84/54.62% 29.19/58.27%
VGG16-Face InceptionResNetV2 37.74/62.48% 39.61/66.31% 42.59/67.23%
ResNet50-Face InceptionResNetV2 40.23/71.09% 43.12/78.62% 48.26/80.63%
5.5 Experiments on Networks with the Same Structure
We set both NetworkA and NetworkB to be ResNet50-Face (the same structure
and the same initialisation), and found that this led to divergence of the algo-
rithm. A potential reason is: this way, these two networks are learning from their
own “white-box attacks”, while they are not able to mask each others’ gradients.
Additionally, we also conduct experiments on ResNet50-Face and ResNet50-
ImageNet (the same structure and different initialisation). As shown in Table 6,
this combination leads to an 2.42% accuracy improvement on adversarial ex-
amples generated by ResNet101-Img, however it also leads to a 2.64% accuracy
decrease on adversarial examples generated by InceptionResNetV2. This may
be because that adversarial examples generated by ResNet101-Img resembles
adversarial examples generated by ResNet50-Img, while they are less correlated
with adversarial examples generated by InceptionResNetV2.
Table 6. Comparison (Classification rates/one-off rates) between training
ResNet50-Face with VGG16-Face and training ResNet50-Face with ResNet50-
Img.
Adv model VGG16-Face ResNet50-Img
ResNet50-Face ResNet101-Img 29.19/58.27% 31.61/61.94%
ResNet50-Face InceptionResNetV2 48.26/80.63% 45.62/77.54%
5.6 Experiments on Other Databases
A series of experiments on MNIST and ImageNet database are also conducted,
however, no significant improvement on ImageNet database and no improvement
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on MNIST database (not worse either) are found compared with ensemble ad-
versarial training method [6]. For ImageNet, we use the same testing method
as [6] where 10,000 testing images are randomly chosen. InceptionResV2 and
VGG16-Face are trained using SATM, and ResNet101 is chosen to be the third
holdout network to generate black-box attacks. As shown in Table 7, compared
with ensemble adversarial training, SATM decreases top-1 error rate by 0.6%
and top-5 error rate by 0.2% on ImageNet. For MNIST, we re-trained structure
A and B [6], and we report averaged black-box attacks error rate for structure
A. As shown in Table 7, no significant improvement can be found on MNIST
database using SATM compared with ensemble adversarial training.
Table 7. Classification error rate on ImageNet and MNIST using ensemble
adversarial training and SATM.
ImageNet
MNIST
Top 1 Top 5
Ensemble 27.0% 7.9% 5.2%
SATM 26.4% 7.7% 5.6%
Different adversarial training methods can be more effective in specific do-
mains (hand-written numbers, faces or objects classification). A potential reason
can be that the distribution of adversarial examples of faces changes more quickly
during the re-training process. Therefore, by using SATM, networks would have
the chance to learn from more adversarial examples with different distribution.
However, this needs to be supported by a more complete hypothesis and further
experiments and we leave this topic for future work.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a novel method (SATM) which trains multiple networks simultane-
ously to improve their robustness to black-box attacks without encountering the
problem of gradient masking. In order to achieve this, SATM uses adversarial ex-
amples that are generated from other networks to re-train the targeted network.
This way, these networks learn from others’ adversarial examples dynamically
and thus all become more resilient to single-step black-box attacks. Furthermore,
we also include a simple domain adaptation method to align features of clean
data and features of adversarial examples to improve the performance. We con-
duct a series of experiments and show that, by using SATM , networks become
slightly more resilient to single-step white-box attacks and significantly more re-
silient to single-step black-box attacks, while their adversarial examples remain
“strong” enough to easily fool undefended networks. We also show that SATM
outperforms the state-of-the-art method on single-step black-box attacks from
holdout networks. In order to further improve the performance, white-box ex-
amples can be used with SATM in various ways, stronger iterative adversarial
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attacks can be used, and a more deliberate domain adaptation method can be
combined with SATM for future work.
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